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APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE CLAR-
ENCE E. BAKER, JUDGE. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS 
The facts in this case are stipulated to and are as 
follows: 
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The respondents (plaintiffs in the District Court) 
in Denver, Colorado, are in the business of selling auto-
mobiles wholesale by auction exclusively to automobile 
dealers for resale. The respondents conditionally sold 
three automobiles to M. R. Bruce, a licensed automobile 
dealer doing business as RaDon Auto Sales at Salt 
Lake City, Utah. The respondents gave possession of 
those automobiles to M. R. Bruce who brought them 
to Salt Lake City and placed them on his used car lot 
for resale. The appellant, Kay Clark, in good faith 
purchased one of these automobiles for the sum of 
$1400.00 in the usual course of trade and paid in full 
for said automobile, the used car dealer representing 
that he was the "lawful owner thereof and of all in-
terest therein". (Exhibit B). 
The respondents brought a Replevin action to 
secure possession of the automobile, and the Trial 
Court held that the respondent had superior title to 
the automobile and could recover it from appellant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT RE-
SPONDENTS ARE ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THEIR TITLE 
AS AGAINST APPELLANT, A BONA F'IDE PURCHASER 
FOR VALUE FROM A DEALER, AND THAT APPELLANT, 
THEREFORE, OBTAINED GOOD TITLE THERETO. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL ·COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT IN 
COLORADO A RESERVATION OF TITLE IN A SALE OF 
PERSONAL PROPERTY IS REGARDED AS A CHATTEL 
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MORTGAGE, AND IS REQUIRED TO BE FILED AS RE-
QUIRED BY THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE STATUTE.,.AND 
THERE _BEI~G NQ QOMPLIANCE WITH THE COLO~Al)O 
STATUTE ON THIS .MATTER THE RESERVATION OF 
TITLE IN THE. RESPONDENT IS INVALID. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT RE-
SPONDENTS ARE ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THEIR TITLE 
AS AGAINST APPELLANT, A BONA FIDE. PURCHASER 
FOR VALUE FROM A DEALER, AND THAT APPELLANT, 
THEREFORE, OBTAINED GOOD TITLE THERETO. 
The general law on this point is dealt with in 47 
A.L.R. 85 and in 88 A.L.R. 109. The numerous citations 
appearing in these annotations le:ave no :.doubt that the 
general rule appears to be: that where goods are sold;. 
on conditional sale, with express or implied· authority· 
to the buyer· to resell them, a purchaser from the buyer ". 
obtain~ good title thereto. ~· 
Basically ·one cannot convey a. greater title than 
he has.· This basic rule conflicts_ with the .attempt to 
prote'ct a bona fide ·purchaser, and, ~~- ex?~P~ion has 
been made in most jurisdictions, either on the. theory 
of esfoppel·o::r 'agency (indicia of title; plus pos~ession) 
where the buyer takes .the goods for -resale and is a 
dealer in such goods. , The ·sub~':endee in that case, if 
he is a purchaser in good faith" hnd 'fbr va]ue, 'is pro-
tected. Whether he is· protected in t~is ·state or :riot will 
depend upon the philosophy or ·the· court and· which ·:of ' 
the ~wo ii.J.nocent p~rtie~ · involy.eq _)hey would rather 
protect. "'\Ve Jeel that the appelhint should prevail. The 
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burden and risk of dealer's dishonesty should be right-
fully placed on those who sell or entrust him with pos-
session of goods without obtaining payment therefor; 
this burden and risk should not be placed upon those 
who purchase from such a dealer in the regular course 
of trade. 
Turning to the Utah law we have felt that it favors 
the appellant's viewpoint and adhere to that decision 
in spite of the decision of the trial court. 
For example, the following comes from the syllabus 
of the Harrison v. Auto Securities Co., et al, 257 P. 677: 
''Innocent purchaser of auto from local agents 
held entitled to possession as against firm holding 
state agency, which intrusted car to local agents 
for purpose of exhibiting it and soliciting sales, 
though sale of particular car was without author-
ity. 
Principal is bound by acts of agents which 
fall within apparent .scope of authority, and will 
not be permitted to deny agent's authority, as 
against innocent third parties who dealt with 
agents in good faith. 
Where one of two innocent parties must suf-
fer from wrongful act of third person, loss should 
fall on one who, by .his conduct, created circum-
stance's which enabled third party to perpetrate 
wrong and cause loss.'' 
So, also in the case of Jones v. Commercial lnvet. 
Trust 64 Utah 151, 22~ P~~· 896: 
"I am of the opinion that when the appellant 
plac.ed its automobile into. the possession of the 
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Naylor-Woodruff Motor Company for the pur-
pose of sale, knowing that the latter was a retail 
dealer in such cars, and that it would hold out 
and advertise itself as the owner thereof and as 
having the right to sell the same, and permitted 
the dealer to exhibit the car for sale in its sales-
room, under the circumstances shown in this case, 
it thereby clothed the dealer with such apparent 
ownership and authority to sell that it ought to 
be, and is estopped to deny as against Jones, who 
purchased the car from the dealer in good faith, 
for full value, in the regular course of the seller's 
business and at retail, and without any knowledge 
or notice of the appellant's claim thereto, that 
the dealer had the right to tnake the sale and to 
assert its superior title to the car.'' 
The Harrison v. Auto Securities case (supra) is also 
to be found in 57 A.L.R. 388, with an annotation on page 
393. Quoting from that annotation we have the follow-
ing: 
"The reported case (I. E. Harrison v. Auto 
Securities) holds that an innocent purchaser for 
value from a retail dealer in automobiles, of an 
automobile intrusted to the dealer by his prin-
cipal solely f.or the purpose of exhibition, the 
soliciting of sales, and the holding of prospective 
purchasers, acquire title, and is entitled to pos-
session thereto, notwithstanding the lack of 
actual or implied authority of the agent to sell. 
A somewhat similar ruling was made in Jones 
'V. Commercial Invest. Trust (supra) where the 
court held that the owner of an automobile who 
placed it in possession of a retail dealer in such 
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cars,..knowing that the dealer would hold out and 
:·.advertise· itself as· owner ·and as having the right 
to ·selL· it,·. and who· permitted the dealer to .·ex. 
hibit ·the· car for sale, thereby clothed the latter 
with an apparent ownership -and authority to 
sell, and was estopped to deny, as against a bona 
·fide purchaser. in· good· faith and for full value 
in regular course of business, and at retail, that 
the dealer had no right to make the sale or assert 
a superior title.'' 
These Utah cases, seem to go along with appellant's 
theory ·of the law. · 
Respondent attempts to throw doubt on the position 
of the Utah Court by reference to Swartz vs. White re. 
ported in 13 P. (2d) 643, Utah case 1932. It is only by 
misconstruing this case that 'the trial court could rule 
against the appellant. We definitely do not feel that ·this 
case justifies any such a holding· for .. tlie.folloWing rea· 
sons: (1) the facts are different; it is not a case of the 
owner giving a dealer possession for -r~sale_in the ordi-
nary cours_e of. ~~siness ;- (2) Section 41-1-72, 1953 Utah 
Code Annotated which that case interpreted as manda· 
tory is expressly analyzed and overruled in the case of 
Jackson v~_James~ 97 Utah 41~89_P. 2d..23g asfollows: 
·'~These provisions~ (i.e. 41-1-72) -are not absolute, 
· · manda:tory, ·.or· controlling· <in· ·their· application . 
... :They: d·o ·not corife~··:b·:r:·aeriy·· srib~ta:ritive rights. 
· --They are procedur.al __ or eVidentiary··in nature~" 
•••••• ~ ... 0 •• ". ~ - • 
. (3) ~he·case.:"its~lf.-on pag~ 6~5. e~pr~ssly::re~ogJ:li.zes .that 
the. principle .. of· .estoppel can. create(· a: b~tter. title. in.the 
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transferee than the transferor himself had, and this is 
the position that we take in the present case. 
We will make no further comment on the law or t·he 
facts. Enough has been stated to present the theory and 
reasoning behind it for the court's consideration. The 
cases are many and the annotations quite exhaustive on 
these matters. To pre'Sent more would not a:dd to the 
knowledge of the court or aid it in the determination of 
this conflict, as the cases and annotation will do that 
better. than this short brief. We refer you to them and 
to the brief of a sister case, also on appeal to this court: 
Joe Heaston and H. R. Ellis, a partnership, dba Heaston-
Ellis Motor Company, Respondents, vs. Manuael l\iar-
tinez, Appellant, Appeal No..................... involving the 
same principles of law. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL ·COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT IN 
COLORADO A RESERVATION OF TITLE IN A SALE OF 
PERSONAL. PROPERTY IS REGARDED AS A CHATTEL 
MORTGAGE, AND IS REQUIRED TO BE FILED AS RE-
::. QUIRED BY THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE STATUTE, AND 
THERE BEING NO COMPLIANCE WITH THE COLORADO 
STATUTE ON THIS MATTER THE RESERVATION OF 
TITLE IN THE RESPONDENT IS INVALID. 
In Colorado a reservation of title in a sale of per-
sonal property is regarded as a chattel mortgage, and is 
required to be filed as required by the chattel mortgage 
statute ( 47 A.L.R. 86); since there has been no offer or 
stipulation of evidence of compliance with the Colorado 
statute or law on this matter, the reservation of title in 
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this case is invalid. 
CONCLUSION 
The holding of the trial court should be reversed. 
Respondents by placing M. R. Bruce in possession of the 
car, ·and by allowing him to transport it from Denver 
to Salt Lake City for purposes of resale cannot now 
assert their claim of title against the appellant who pur-
chased from Bruce in the usual course of trade for value 
and without notice of respondents' claim. This conclu-
sion is inescapable in the light of the better reasoned 
cases and upon well established general rules of estoppel; 
and in addition rests upon the well known principle that 
where one of two innocent parties must suffer from the 
wrongful act of ·a third person, the loss should fall on 
the one who, by his conduct, created the circumstances 
which enabled the third party to perpetrate the wrong 
and cause the loss. 
It will be seen then that the position of t.he appellant 
rests not only upon strong and compelling equitable 
grounds insofar as it protects the innocent purchaser 
from ·a ret·ail dealer, but would also ultimately accrue to 
the advantage of the wholesale used car dealer himself. 
If we follow the respondent's contention to its logical 
conclusion, an intending purchaser in order to secure 
his position as a bona fide purchaser for value would 
have to require that the retail dealer before purchase 
show him a re~stration certificate indicating a transfer 
on the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles of 
. . 
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the State of Utah. With the fluctuating value of used 
cars, such a requirement would ultimately wreck havoc 
with the ret,ail dealers' business, and, indirectly, of 
course, the wholesaler business also, and would impede 
the normal flow of commerce in that trade. And when 
this condition is added to the fact that it would uproot 
well established principles of law, which have been re-
peatedly enunciated by the courts of the land, we submit 
t that the position of the appellant is the only tenable one. 
,, 
We urge, therefore, that the decision should be re-
versed with instructions to enter judgment in favor of 
the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRIS T. PRAGGASTIS and 
JOHN E. STONE 
Attorneys forr Appellant 
Received a copy of the foregoing brief this ------------ day 
of September, 1954. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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